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Abstract 
 
In the wake of the global change of a new accumulation regime in main capitalist economies, the 
opening up and liberalisation process of emerging economies from the 1980s has provoked great 
expectations that resulted in recurrent disappointing crises. Studied as a stylized fact, the Turkish 
experience leads us to evaluate the role of liberalised macroeconomic environment, unsuitable 
economic policies and hesitant and weak regulatory mechanisms as the main sources of perverse 
sequencing in the reform area. The paper shows that the Turkish crises since the 1980s arose from 
bad macroeconomic policies which implemented the neo-liberal shock therapy model and triggered 
boom-and-bust cycles. After three decades of liberal reforms, the Turkish economy remains still 
subject to structural downturns as the economic recovery is not guaranteed by a hasty liberalisation 
but by consistent policies which should frame economic actors‟ behaviour in the aim of a sustainable 
macroeconomic development. 
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I. Introduction 
In the wake of the global change of a new accumulation regime in the main capitalist 
economies, the opening up and liberalisation process of emerging economies from 
the 1980s has provoked great expectations that resulted in recurrent crises. Large 
capital inflows, without relevant economic policies and regulatory frames, had fuelled 
structural fragilities and created large economic imbalances as well as social 
distortions. As the lack of proper institutional structure failed to channel the inflows 
into sustainable productive plans, the speculative investments gained ground on 
development objectives and exacerbated monetary and financial instabilities.  
The present global financial crisis raises again the issue of how 
interdependencies between idiosyncratic bank risks and financial systems‟ stability 
might be better managed to prevent the recurrence of such crises. Monetary and 
financial authorities all around the world implement emergency policies. But they do 
not consider a suitable analysis of the financial-instability hypothesis which would be 
able to point up the weaknesses of the current market-oriented monetary and 
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financial regulatory framework. While the emerging markets seem not to be dragged 
down for the moment with the current crisis, their structural vulnerabilities continue to 
haunt the future of the path-dependent growth policies. 
Turkish economy can be studied as a stylized fact to evaluate the role of weak 
liberalised macroeconomic environment, unsuitable economic policies and regulatory 
failures which are the source of perverse sequencing in the liberalisation process. 
The main argument in this paper is that since the financial and economic 
integration of the Turkish economy had (and has) a preference for a hasty and rapid 
liberalisation process without considering the structural needs and capacities of the 
whole economy, government had (and has) no room to conduct consistent 
macroeconomic policies in order to frame sustainable economic and social 
environment. Consequently, one should expect new crises in the aftermath of the 
actual global crisis. 
In this aim, the paper is organised as follows.  
The second section presents some theoretical grounds on the consequences 
of a hasty financial liberalisation and points out the fact that acting as a magnet for 
unstable movements in an unstable environment, the swift opening-up of domestic 
markets and financial liberalisation lead market reforms to fuel several recurrent 
monetary and financial crises.  
The third section recalls the main banking and financial reforms, implemented 
since the 1980s, and points out their effects on the Turkish economy. Increasing 
monetary disequilibria and monetary stabilisation programmes put the economy 
under a persistent burden and reduce its ability to cope with external and internal 
difficulties in order to reach a sustainable growth path. Then, we argue that the 
Turkish crises arose from bad macroeconomic policies which had been founded on 
the neo-liberal shock therapy and triggered boom-and-bust cycles.  
The fourth section analyses the preparation of the 2001 crisis through the rise 
of banking risks inferred by irregular behaviours. It shows that contrary to the 
hypotheses of shock therapy models, there is no spontaneous mechanism of 
competition which could push market actors to adopt efficient behaviours on the 
macroeconomic level. In fact, the reforms provoke modifications that induce irregular 
bank behaviours and generate a macular degeneration encouraged by the 
speculative financing of the national debt.  
The fifth section asserts that the high growth era in the aftermath of the 2000-
2001 Turkish crises is not due to a strengthening of internal (improvement of income 
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distribution, expansionist stabilisation policies, etc.) and external (current account 
balance and capital inflows) resilience but to the cyclical opportunities due to the 
global speculative boom in the world during 2003-2007 as soaring and abundant 
speculative liquidities on global markets in the aftermath of the dotcom crisis have 
spurred emerging economies on the whole. In the face of the current global reversal, 
the Turkish economy seems not to be able to prevent the world-wide consequences 
of the current financial turmoil as its vulnerabilities remain worrisome. The 
competitiveness remains weak, the sustainability of the financial system as well as 
that of the real sector depend closely on unstable capital inflows and the path of the 
growth is not reinforced by an increase of the national and well distributed 
accumulation. 
The last section concludes. 
 
II. Theoretical grounds on the consequences of a hasty financial liberalisation  
The financial liberalisation is regarded as a first step in market-oriented reforms in 
emerging economies. However, acting as a magnet for unstable movements in an 
unstable environment, hasty opening-up of domestic markets and financial 
liberalisation make that market reforms are often accompanied by severe recurrent 
monetary and financial crises.  
The effects of the financial globalisation, usually identified by the liberalisation 
of capital markets1, are assumed to be less beneficial to emerging economies 
(Goldstein and Turner, 1996, Ülgen, 2008) as well as to developed ones (Griefel-
Tatje and Lovell, 1996, Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). Also, the negative effects of 
free capital inflows are often underestimated. Increasing of external (over)liquidities 
can lead to more conservative monetary policies against expected inflation and then 
to a rise of domestic interest rates that reduces the available finance for productive 
plans. Moreover, high capital inflows can provoke exchange rate appreciation and 
reduce the price competitiveness of tradable goods and impede the growth. Such 
consequences are sources of macroeconomic instability without improving economic 
structure. Actually, spontaneous evolution of market institutions reveals to be 
complex and difficult to be implemented. Great resiliency of local structures, hasty 
implementations and lacks of regulatory structures can provoke serious disequilibria. 
Business failures and banking and financial crises succeed one another and reduce 
                                                 
1
 with a outgoing of centralized national regulatory mechanisms. 
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the credibility of reforms in public opinion (Ülgen, 2007). Another binding constraint to 
add to this evolution is the growing inequalities and a bad income distribution leading 
to a worse growth in the long run. 
Third generation models of crises show how problems in the banking and 
financial system interact with currency crises, and how these crises can have real 
effects on the whole economy (Chang and Velasco, 2001). These models also put 
into the fore interdependencies between domestic structures and conditions under 
which the opening-up is implemented. The success of reforms depends on minimal 
conditions required in the development of the banking and financial system (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998) but also on the evolution of regulatory supervision structures 
previous to the liberalisation. But in emerging financial systems with structural 
fragilities the liberalisation is implemented quickly despite weak regulatory schemes 
the soundness of which plays a decisive role in systemic stability (Alper and Öniş, 
2002, Ganioğlu, 2007)).  
Reforms generate various movements of innovation on financial markets and 
the opening submits domestic savings to the effects of global phenomena that 
suddenly expose banks to new practices on public debt and on real estate and 
derivative markets. The increasing power of the short-term financial flows and the 
weight of the capital movements on the liquidity of the banking system affect the 
commitments of banks by leading them to privilege the portfolio investments at the 
expense of the long-term investments, what engenders severe problems for the 
efficiency of the system of credit. Moreover, changes in different economies call for 
different and various ways of imagining and implementing of reforms and their speed 
should be graduated in order to satisfy the society‟s targets. Achieving of the targets 
is related to specific structures of an economy and depends also on the 
determination of authorities to lead sustainable development policies (Stiglitz, 2008).  
The financial stability reveals to be a sine qua non condition of the economic 
growth. In the case of Asian countries (Irwin and Vines, 1999) as well as in the case 
of the Turkish and Argentina crises (Eichengreen, 2001), vulnerabilities seem to be 
accentuated by capital markets liberalisation when domestic markets are not yet 
prepared for the consequences of such changes. Prasad et al. (2003) show that 
financial integration has to be implemented and controlled with precaution in order to 
reinforce the reform absorption capacity of economies. Voluntary and conscious 
intervention of authorities should aim to create and reinforce a frame consistent with 
the needs and capacities of economies in transition. Stiglitz et al. (2006) advocate 
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therefore in favour of capital inflows control to protect the inflows from the volatility of 
speculative finance. 
The financial systems in transition which are characterized by a fast 
liberalisation often undergo the consequences of weaknesses and inadequacy of 
their regulatory infrastructure in their process of evolution. Turkey, following the 
example of numerous emergent economies, constitutes a stylized fact corresponding 
to these issues as the Turkish crises since the 1980s arose from bad macroeconomic 
policies which implemented neo-liberal shock therapy model of the triptych 
„stabilisation-liberalisation-privatisation‟ and then triggered boom-and-bust cycles. 
 
III. Banking reforms, increasing disequilibria and monetary stabilisation 
programmes 
From 1980, Turkey turns to a liberal model leaving interventionist development 
policies of the 1960-70s. The abolition of the previous bank regulatory schemes 
constitutes one of the first steps in the transition of the Turkish economy towards a 
more opened market economy. During the period of numerous reforms between 
1980 and 1994, formal measures are quickly taken by replacing the development of 
the banking system on a fast liberalisation and on an opening to the international 
competition.  
This period of reforms resulted in a first large-scale twin crisis (exchange and 
banking crisis) in 1994 and opened a new era of successive stabilisation 
programmes while with the liberalisation of the capital account in 1989, the economy 
became more integrated into the international circuits. This evolution made the 
sustainability of the debt closely dependent on the sensitivity of markets to the 
current exchange regime and to the problems of liquidity of the banking system. 
The first phase (1980-1983) took place within the framework of stabilisation 
and structural adjustment programmes. This phase of application of the shock 
therapy was based on the hypothesis that a fast opening and liberalisation would 
lead markets to stabilise spontaneously. Diverse controls and regulations were 
appreciably reduced or abolished (ceilings on interest rates, conditions of entry into 
the banking markets). 
The financial modernization was based on the creation of new instruments 
through the development of securities markets. The first certificates of deposits 
appeared in July 1980 and the Council of capital markets with discretionary power is 
established in 1982 to develop the securities market. However, the restrictive 
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monetary policy followed during this period reduced strongly the domestic demand 
and contributed to the deterioration of the real sector‟s situation. 
In this context of rapid evolution, the increased competition amongst banks for 
the collection of the deposits, but also the creation of "bankers", kind of financial 
intermediaries (of a number exceeding several thousand establishments) working in 
a Ponzi scheme through the aggressive issues of certificates of deposits, provoked 
an intense pressure on interest rates2. The lack of a regulatory environment which 
would be able to guide the activities of banks and to intervene in the resolution of 
possible shocks and growing liquidity problems led to bankruptcies of some financial 
institutions in 1982. This revealed that the liberalisation and the subsequent 
increased wild competition were not enough to strengthen quickly the financial 
system. 
The second phase (1983-1988) was more intensive in institutional reforms. In 
the aim of satisfying the expectations of depositors, negatively affected by the 
previous bankers‟ failures, the Savings and Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) was 
created in 1983. From 1984 residents can hold deposits in foreign currencies and 
banks assets abroad. To develop the new financial markets, Istanbul Stock 
Exchange was created in 1985. At the same time, a new banking law, to reduce the 
fragility of the sector, compelled banks to hold minimal reserves for their capital 
adequacy and to record non-performing loans separately and cover them by 
reserves. This law also introduced a standardized accounting system and imposed to 
banks the obligation of annual regular external audit. In 1986, the Banking 
supervision department of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (TCMB, 
henceforth) is involved in the supervision of the system under the control of the 
Treasury. Besides, the TCMB began its open market operations from 1987.  
The third phase (1988-1994), expected as the outcome period of the reforms, 
marked the opening of the capital account (liberalised in August 1989) and the 
liberalisation of the foreign exchange market. Banks became free to determine their 
exchange rates but their contribution to the financing of the economy remained rather 
shy and the opening of the market did not provoke the expected consequences on 
the monetarization of the economy: 
 
                                                 
2
 For a Minskian analysis of financial crises in developing countries (as the case of Thailand over 
1884-1998) see Schroeder, 2002. 
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Chart 1: Monetary aggregates and bank loans (Source: TÜİK, 2006) 
(%) 1980 1983 1988 1989 1993 1994 
M1/GNP 13.28 13.93 8.77 8.5 6.48 5.94 
M2/GNP 16.63 23.6 21.06 20.47 14.16 16.22 
Domestic bank loans/GNP 25.01 24.59 23.17 19.43 22.72 19.91 
 
On the macroeconomic level, the development strategy, based on the 
increase of exports and which had given the growth rates on average raised around 
7% a year in the previous phase, met its limits and macroeconomic indicators quickly 
deteriorated. The economy underwent a contraction, the growth rate of the GNP 
decreased from 9.8 % in 1987 to 1.6 % in 1989. The current account deficit rose to 
2625 billion US$ in 1990 (Chart 3). In 1993, the balance was of -6433 billion with a 
trade account deficit amounting to -14081 billion. The exports/imports ratio fell from 
81.4 % in 1988 to 52.1 % in 1993. This picture has also been accompanied by strong 
fluctuations in the exchange rate US$/TL: 
Chart 2: Annual change of US$/TL (Source: TCMB and TÜİK 2006) 
1987 35 % 
1988 78 % 
1990 26,7 % 
1991 73,4 % 
 
During the reforms, strong pressures have appeared also on the labour market 
resulting at the same time from the population growth and from the continuous 
migration towards big cities whereas the disparities were persisting; the coefficient of 
Gini rising from 0.44 in 1987 to 0.49 in 1994. In 1994, the average income of the 
upper quintile in the national income was 9.2 and 11.9 times more than the average 
incomes of the lower quintile, respectively, in the rural zones and in the urban zones 
(Şenses, 2003, p. 94). Although the rate of absolute poverty was relatively low on 
average (7.3% in 1994), it was very high in the poorest region (14.5 %) while it was 
2.3 % in the richest region, denoting a very strong interregional disparity. 
The liberalisation policies occasioned then a change in the regime of 
accumulation which is jammed between a very unstable growth path -unable to 
improve the general well-being of the population- and a more and more fragile 
monetary and financial structure -unable to contribute to the financing of the 
production and to the macroeconomic stability-. The outcome of this evolution has 
been a large-scale twin crisis (exchange and banking crises) in 1994, launching 
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recurrent monetary stabilisation programmes with ambiguous effects on the expected 
cleaning up of the economy. 
After more than a decade of reforms, the imbalances became dependent on 
the volatility of short-term capital flows. The sensitivity of these flows, increasing 
under the influence of international (Gulf crisis in 1990-91) and national events, 
generated pressures on the growth path. 
Chart 3: Macroeconomic indicators 1980-1994 (Source: TÜİK, 2006 and 2009) 
(%) 1980 1983 1987 1988 1989 1990 1993 1994 
CPI (change/year) 101.4 31.4 38.9 73.7 63.3 60.3 66.1 106.3 
Average interest rate on 1 year deposits  
(end of the year) 
33 45 52 83.9 58.8 59.4 74.7 95.6 
Discount rate of TCMB 26 48.5 45 54 54 45 54.5 55 
Growth rate (GNP, constant prices) -2.8 4.2 9.8 1.5 1.6 9.4 8.1 -6.1 
Domestic debt Stock/GNP 13.6 22.8 23 22 18.2 14.4 17.9 20.6 
External debt Stock/GNP 19.34 31.08 46.79 45.02 38.82 32.59 37.45 48.29 
External debt service/GNP 0.29 6.03 5.9 7.44 6.44 4.79 4.44 6.99 
Share of  
the short-term external debt/Total external debt 
n. a. 11.86 18.95 15.76 13.76 19.37 27.51 17.24 
Current account (million  US$) -3408 -1923 -806 1596 961 -2625 -6433 2631 
Trade account (millions US$) -4603 -2990 -3206 -1813 -4190 -9448 -14081 -4167 
Current account/GNP -4.98 -3.18 -0.94 1.76 0.89 -1.74 -3.6 2.0 
Total domestic bank loans/GNP 25.01 24.59 27.74 23.17 19.43 18.62 22.72 19.91 
 
From 1990, the economy has had high growth rates but without real 
stabilisation in the key indicators. In spite of a restrictive monetary policy, the 
inflationary trend has been persistent. The consumer price index (CPI) varied over 
1983-1994 between 31.4 % and 106.3 %. Despite an increased competition on 
financial markets, interest rates remained high. Over 1983-1994, the average rates 
on term deposits have been between 45 % and 95.6 %. The average interbank repo 
rate was of 39.09 % in 1986 and of 106.31 % in 1995. The macroeconomic fragilities 
have fed the increasing internal and external deficits. Domestic debt stock/GNP ratio 
varied between 21.9 % and 20.6 % over 1983-1994. That of the external debt 
followed an ascending evolution from 31.08 % in 1984 to 48.29 % in 1994 by which 
the share of the short-term debt increased parallel to the total external debt (Chart 3). 
In order to mitigate the persistency of the disequilibrium, the Turkish 
government started a programme of disinflation from the mid-1998 under the control 
of the IMF. But the effects of the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-1998 have 
provoked a break in the capital flows in 1998 without causing banking and exchange 
crises. However, the uncertainties of the general election of April and the 
earthquakes in 1999 have contributed to the deterioration of the public accounts. In 
front of the persistency of the inflation and the frank deterioration of the economic 
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activity (the growth declined from 3.9 % in 1998 to -6.1 % in 1999), the authorities 
opted for another programme of disinflation, based this time on the external credibility 
of the national currency. They put into place a crawling peg exchange regime3 at the 
end of 1999 with the approval of the IMF.  
While a new banking law and the creation of the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA) tried to frame this programme, strong tensions on the 
liquidity of the banking system appeared and 5 private banks have been declared 
insolvent and transferred to the SDIF. These tensions provoked, in November, 2000, 
sharp increases in interest rates and markets‟ expectations turned to a close 
devaluation. The monetary stabilisation policy, based on an almost fixed exchange 
rate regime, in an environment of free capital movements, showed itself unbearable. 
Chart 4: Macroeconomic indicators 1995-2001 (source: TÜİK, 2006 and 2009) 
(%) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
CPI (change/year) 88 80.4 85.7 84.7 64.9 54.9 54.4 
Average interest rate on 1 year deposits (end of the year) 91.30 93.80 96.6 95.5 46.7 45.6 62.5 
Discount rate of TCMB 50 57 67 80 60 70 70 
Growth rate (GNP, constant prices) 8 7.1 8.3 3.9 -6.1 6.3 -9.5 
Domestic debt stock/GNP * 17.3 21 21.4 21.7 29.3 29 69.2 
External debt stock/GNP * 41.93 43.45 43.8 46.6 55.7 59.3 78 
External debt service/GNP 5.77 6.2 6.5 8 9.9 11 16.9 
Share of the short-term external debt/Total external debt * 21.43 21.5 21 21.6 22.2 23.9 14.4 
Current account (million US$) -2339 -2437 -2638 -2000 -925 -9920 3760 
Trade account (million US$) -13152 -10264 -15048 -14038 -9771 -22057 -3363 
Current account/GNP -1.4 -1.3 -1.4 1.0 -0.73 -4.9 2.3 
Total domestic bank loans/GNP 20.66 24.44 27.02 22 22.19 22.81 20.46 
* New series from 1996. 
While the competitiveness has been deteriorated and financial markets 
remained very weakly directed to the financing of productive activities, the economy 
became completely dependent on capital inflows for the sustainability of the external 
debt. Also the short open position of the banking system has started to increase; of 
4.6 billion US$ in 1999 it raised to 8.55 billion in 2000. The mechanisms of financing, 
under the influence of a high volatility of interest rates, underwent then what we can 
call the “macular degeneration”4. The short rates (from 1 day to 1 month) increased 
from 70 % to 300 % at the end of November 2000 and in December 4, they reached 
                                                 
3
 The par value of the stated currency is adjusted frequently due to some factors such as inflation or 
growth rate. This gradual shift of the currency's par value is done as an alternative to a 
sudden and significant devaluation of the currency. 
4
 Macular degeneration is a loss of vision in the center of the visual field (the macula) because of 
damage to the retina. Macular degeneration, in the Turkish case, made it difficult or impossible to 
recognize vulnerabilities, although enough peripheral vision remained to allow short-term economic 
activities. 
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2500 %. The central bank continued to defend its credibility programme through the 
stabilisation of the exchange rate whereas the imbalances persisted and soiled the 
relevance of the monetary system and the sustainability of the growth regime. The 
ratio of current account/FX reserves, highly fluctuating and often negative, shrank 
from 8.97 % in 1998 to -4.16 % in 1999 and to -43.13 % in 2000: 
Chart 5: Current account and FX reserves 1992-2001 (Calculation from the data of TÜİK 2006 and TCMB) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
(A)Current account (million US$) -974 -6433 2631 -2339 -2437 -2638 2000 -925 -9920 3760 
(B)FX reserves  (million US$) 4800 6900 5300 13300 15700 17400 22300 22200 23000 19100 
A/B (%) -20.29 -93.2 49.64 -17.58 -15.52 -15.16 8.97 -4.16 -43.13 19.7 
 
The capital flows overturned and put the market into a position of illiquidity. In 
November 2000, 5.037 billion dollars outflowed. First five months of year 2001, the 
net outflows had been about 3.562 billion: 
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Figure 1: (Un)Sustainability of the growth regime
(calculation from the data of TÜİK 2006)
current account (%GNP) capital inflows (%GNP) GNP (% change/year)
 
The IMF announced, in December 2000, an additional line of loan of 7.5 billion 
dollars and the government declared its guarantee on all the commitments. But 
despite this prompt financing from the IMF, markets‟ ardours have not been calmed; 
the capital outflows became more marked and resulted in February 2001 in the 
gravest crisis of the republican history: a depreciation of about 60 %; the short rates 
had been fluctuating until 5000 % between 21/12/2000 and 19/03/2001 to come 
down to 150 % in May 2001 and to 66 % at the end of the same year. 
The high sensitivity of the economy to the problems of illiquidity is increased 
by a preliminary inappropriate preparation of the financial liberalisation. Alper and 
Öniş (2002) characterize the role played by the banking system in the escalation of 
imbalances by the distortions inferred by the dominance of public banks, the problem 
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of open positions of banks and the "politicization" of new entries into the banking 
sector. Özkan-Günay and Günay (2007) identifies the inadequate regulatory system, 
the weak supervision and the political interferences as the factors that contributed to 
the intensification of the banking system fragilities. Yayla et al. (2008) underline the 
high sensitivity of the Turkish banking and financial markets and the weight of a high 
probability of systematic default until 2003 resulting from the institutional vulnerability 
of banks to the volatility of capital and risk markets. The weaknesses of regulatory 
mechanisms, which reduced the capacity of supervision and intervention of the 
authorities, appear to be a decisive concern in this picture. The absence of new 
regulatory rules that should accompany the process of liberalisation left the banking 
system in a highly risky environment (Green et al. 2005).  
 
IV. Banking risks inferred by irregular behaviours 
Contrary to the hypotheses of shock therapy models, there is no spontaneous 
mechanism of competition which could push market actors to adopt efficient 
behaviours on the macroeconomic level. In fact, the reforms provoke modifications 
which reduce sharply the efficiency and the field of regulatory mechanisms on 
banking and financial markets, and so create a fragile institutional environment. 
On the one hand, it is worthy of underlining the distortion led by the rule of the 
public banks whose loan strategies remained under the influence of the electoral 
considerations and determined the rent-seeking strategies of certain groups of 
interest close to the government. Two public banks (Ziraat Bankası -directed to the 
agricultural sector- and Halk Bank -directed to the small business and artisans) were 
at the centre of this process after the crisis of 1994. 6 stabilisation programmes, 
under the control of the IMF, aiming mainly at reducing the importance of the extra 
budgetary funds, have had the effect of placing on these establishments the burden 
of the distribution of rents. 
On the other hand, the entry into the sector has been dominated by similar 
political considerations (Alper and Öniş, 2002). After the elections of 1991, 6 new 
private banks are authorized to enter the sector in particular through networks of 
influence between some industrial groups and the government. These banks all went 
bankrupt in the followed years. The example of Interbank, Türkbank, İmarbank and 
Egebank, owners of which were close to the government and which were transferred 
to the SDIF from 1999, is eloquent (FEMISE, 2005). The huge costs of such 
bankruptcies (estimated at several billion dollars) stem from the phenomenon of 
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tunneling (Johnson et al. 2000) which consists of the appropriation, through illegal 
ways, of the assets and profits of a firm by a small group of persons who hold the 
control of management and decision. This phenomenon is not related only to the 
liberalisation but it is well fuelled in such an environment. Hellman, Jones and 
Kaufmann (2000) support the idea that this phenomenon is mainly related to the 
capture of the power5 by some groups of interest after the liberalisation and mainly 
due to the deficiencies of the regulatory mechanisms implemented by the authorities. 
In this environment, instead of contributing to revitalize and to modernize the sector, 
the entry of new and/or foreign banks is directed to operations of implicit cooperation 
with public authorities or with domestic banks aiming to benefit from high returns on 
an increasing national debt. 
Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) underlines that with the increase of the 
competition on financial markets, banks are more incited to enter into competition for 
the collection of deposits by offering higher interest rates to the expenses, often, of 
their balance-sheet stability. This, accompanied by the limited liability of banks in the 
regulatory system, creates an environment dominated by the moral hazard; the 
highly risky investments -the cost of bankruptcy of which is partially transferable on 
public funds- becoming more attractive. More interesting is that the model suggests 
that on highly competitive markets, there is no equilibrium at which a bank would 
choose to invest in a sound way. Indeed, banks adopt excessively optimistic and 
short-sighted positions by financing firms or holdings which are not financially and 
economically sound. This macular degeneration is also increased by more and more 
speculative opportunist behaviours under the pressure of markets recently opened. 
An incentive factor of this myopia is the way of financing the national debt 
through speculative instruments which fed a new regime of financial accumulation. In 
the first phases of reforms, the need of financing of the public sector reported to the 
GNP followed a downward path (passing from 8.8 % in 1980 to 5.7 % in 1989). But 
from the 1990s, a noteworthy increase is observed reaching 7.4 % in 1990 and 12 % 
in 1993. Then, from the 1990 onwards, the borrowing requirement of the debt has 
directed the monetary policies and consequently banks‟ strategies (Aydın, 2002). The 
                                                 
5
 The corruption of the power develops between public decision-makers and private actors because of 
the weakness of supervisory structure in the process of transformation. This weakness provokes the 
“state capture” phenomenon (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000). Generally, economies where the 
state capture is strong, the less developed institutions are mainly intended to supply specific 
advantages to lobbies and influential firms without trying to improve the institutional structures and the 
modalities of management of economic relations. 
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continuous increase of returns on the national debt financing incited private banks to 
neglect the distribution of credit in the economy. The ratio of Domestic bank loans 
(DBL)/Public debt hold by banks (as Government bonds and Treasury bills, PBB) fell 
in a considerable way denoting a real modification in the market strategy of the 
system. Now, between 1986 and 2001, on a consolidated base, the bank assets 
increased more than the GNP (Chart 6) without improving the real sector financing. 
One can observe, on the contrary, a decline of the share of commercial loans; the 
ratio DBL/GNP decreased from 19.6 % to 18.1 % over the period whereas the ratio 
DBL/Bank deposits shrank from 70.4 % to 31 %: 
Chart 6: Change of banks’ market strategies 1986-2001  
(Source: TCMB, Treasury Undersecretary and Aydın, 2002) 
(%) 1986 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 
DBL/PBB 6,8 4,5 3,7 3,5 4,3 3,5 3,7 3,9 3,9 5,2 3,5 4,8 3,1 1,6 1,8 0,6 
PBB/Total issue of 
public bonds 
n. a. 77,7 90,5 90,2 85,9 92,8 79,1 77,8 71,5 81,6 84,4 89,5 86,8 85,3 75,9 74,5 
Assets/GNP 
(banking system) 
45,4 52,4 49,9 42,42 38,8 41,5 45,14 47,8 45,6 46,8 54,1 59,4 62,55 82,75 76,3 85,1 
DBL/Bank 
deposits 
70,4 72,7 64,7 62,87 74,31 63,96 66,48 76,1 49,46 56,55 57,02 66,12 54,14 40,25 47,08 31 
 
Özatay and Sak (2003) reveal that the 2001 crisis has started through the 
increase of the fragilities of the banking sector. The risk accumulation and the rise of 
imbalances for the whole sector are mainly related to the enrolment of banks in 
speculative operations through very short-term commitments that are mismatched in 
their maturity as well as in their currency denomination and accompany an increase 
of non-performing loans. In such a strategy, the banking system external borrowing in 
foreign currencies has been used to finance the public debt in TL. The ratio FX 
Liabilities/Total Liabilities of banks went from 11.7 % in 1986 to 42.7 % in 1995 and 
to 50.8 % in 2001. So, since the 1990s, the external open positions of banks were 
increasing, banks trying to benefit from uncovered interest differentials without 
improving their structural profitability in a stable way: 
Chart 7:  Open positions and the profitability ratio of the banking system 1988-2000 (source: TBB, 2009) 
(%) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
FX Assets/FX 
Liabilities 
103.8 105.3 88.1 90 86.8 84.6 96.5 90.6 93.6 89.6 84.9 79.4 76 
Open position 
(FX Liabilities-FX 
Assets)/Equity 
Capital * 
-14.6 -16.5 39.6 44.2 80.7 104.8 26.6 73.4 50.6 81.1 123.1 362.7 212.2 
Net profit at the 
end of 
period/Total 
Assets 
n. a. 2.1 2.8 2.4 2.8 3.5 2.2 3.4 3.9 3.4 2.7 -0.6 -3.1 
* A negative value means a long position, assets being higher than liabilities. 
So we find one of the characteristics of a speculative environment with a 
structural incentive for banks to make commitments in highly profitable operations but 
which are fed by a continuous growth of their short open positions. Under such 
circumstances, currency crisis usually provokes banking crisis. When the monetary 
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authorities remain attached to the anchoring of the exchange rate in spite of 
increasing of the public debt borrowing requirement, banks are encouraged to 
finance public issues through their FX borrowing from abroad, so the phenomenon of 
dollarization becomes dominant. The part of FX assets in total bank assets increased 
from 26 % in 1998 to 38 % in 1999 and that of FX liabilities from 25 % to 48 %. The 
share of FX deposits in total bank deposits was 50 % in 1999 and 61 % in 2001 with 
an average term of 3 months.  
Mohanty and Klau (2004) show that the monetary authorities in emerging 
countries are in front of a dilemma by respecting their anti-inflationary commitments 
through a fixed exchange rate and their access to foreign capital what holds interest 
rates at high levels and harms the growth. As also stated by Stiglitz et al. (2006), 
constraints can be more binding on emerging economies than on advanced ones as 
the authorities are not always able to use counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary 
policies; they are under the constraint of calming the ardours of foreign capital flows. 
In such an environment, the main activity of the Turkish banks was based on foreign 
capital inflows led by the stabilisation of the exchange rate, what allowed investors to 
arbitrate between high domestic interest rates and lower international rates. This 
financial path increased the open positions of banks and generated the dollarization 
of the economy (M2Y (M2+FX deposits). Then, the viability of the system became 
closely dependent on the probability of a sudden depreciation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The persistency of the current account deficit and the vulnerability of the 
banking system prevented the structural transformations from reaching a stable 
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macroeconomic state and stumbled over a sudden stop of the capital flows. The 
consequence of this crisis has been to contract the GDP of 9.5 % in real terms and 
the domestic demand of 21 % in 2001. 
The crisis intervention was designed to overcome banking system‟s and public 
debt‟s weaknesses while meeting the claims of the creditors. Much of the crisis 
resolution effort has been used to pay foreign private liabilities and to cover the 
outflows of foreign portfolio investments. Without a credible strategy for involving the 
private sector (and especially bankers and debt holders) in crisis resolution through 
temporary standstills on sovereign debt, the Turkish government has been reluctant 
to implement long-term structural development-seeking policies for fear of worsening 
its access to global capital markets. Such a choice put the burden of the resolution 
on the entire economy, saving the rentier (bond-holding) class. As Akyüz and 
Boratav state “For obvious reasons neither monetization nor a capital levy nor any 
other measure that would place a sizeable burden on the rentier class can be 
successfully applied when the capital account is open and the domestic currency is 
fully convertible. In other words, the conditions that make it difficult to manage the 
external value of the currency also aggravate the difficulties in managing internal 
debt” (2002, pp. 30-31). 
 
V. Great expectations, deceptive recovery and future trouble in the wake of the 
financial turmoil 
The pre-crisis vulnerabilities such as large account deficits, bad directed credit 
growth, high levels of short-term debt, are giving cause for concern and remain open 
to several spillovers. Changes in the international trade and international borrowing 
conditions serve as key transmission channels. While not directly exposed to the 
roots of the financial crisis on advanced markets, many emerging economies 
experience sharp downturns. The turmoil in advanced financial markets serves as a 
potent channel of transmission to these countries. Even in the economies with 
relatively low international financial integration, financial channels transmit advanced 
economies growth spillovers6 as well as the trade channels spur similar distress in 
emerging economies.  
                                                 
6
 Such spillovers are called by Masson (1998) “mansoonal effects” as the policies implemented in 
industrial countries can contemporaneously provoke crisis effects in emerging economies (through 
trade linkages and the dependency of emerging economies‟ monetary stabilisation programmes on 
the monetary and exchange rate policies in advanced economies). 
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It is usually admitted that as it came out of the 2001 crisis Turkey succeeded 
to improve some of its sources of fragility through an inflation-targeting monetary 
policy, a public-debt reducing fiscal policy (with a high primary surplus objective of 
6.5% on average) and the restructuring of the banking system‟s balance sheets.  
Actually, the current weaknesses of the Turkish economy are not principally 
founded on the banking system‟s exposition to external downturns at least in the 
short-term while the contribution of the banking system to the financing of the real 
economy remains excessively low7 (Chart 9). On the whole, the Turkish banking 
system, under the lessons of the 2001 crisis, has been restructured especially by 
decreasing its exposition to foreign exchange risks. The number of banks has been 
reduced to 49 as by 2008 with a relatively high concentration; the share of the 5 
biggest of the sector is equal to 60% higher than the average of the Euro zone (of 
45%). The ratio of Deposits/GDP has increased to 50% (albeit less than the 117% of 
the Euro zone). However, the Bank balance-sheet/GDP ratio remains one of the 
lowest of the EU (less than 90%, just above that of Poland and Romania). The 
dollarization is, nevertheless, reduced as the ratio of Foreign currency deposits/Total 
deposits decreased from more than 40% in the 1990s to less than 33% on 2005-
2009. As the share of foreign banks in domestic banks‟ capital structure remains low 
(less than 25% in 2008 and 2009, less than the new members of the EU), Turkish 
banks had not been enrolled in the current speculative finance crisis. The profitability 
(net profit/total assets) of the sector reached again its levels of the pre-2001 crisis 
with an average of 2.1% on 2003-2008 with a net interest margin of 4.6% on 
average, higher than that of US banks (3.5%) and of EU banks (1.1%) on the same 
period. Also, the return on equity ratio evolved on average around 15.8% (USA: 
10.9% and EU: 10.3%, with sharp decrease from 2008). The capital adequacy ratio 
remains high on average albeit on a decreasing path: 
Chart 8: Banking system’s capital adequacy ratio (%) (Source: TCMB May, 2010) 
 USA Banks EU Banks Turkish Banks 
2003 12.8 12.4 30.9 
2004 12.6 11.9 28.8 
2005 12.3 11.4 23.7 
2006 12.4 11.1 21.9 
2007 12.2 11.4 18.9 
2008 12.7 11.7 18 
 
                                                 
7
 The ratio Bank loans/GDP is one of the lowest amongst emerging economies. 
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Therefore, one can assert that Turkey has adopted the best practices in its 
financial management in the wake of the 2001 crisis. However, the fact that Turkey 
was strongly hit in many ways by the current financial crisis shows that a financially 
liberalised economy always keeps many sources of vulnerability as it remains at the 
effects of changes in external financial markets. As noted by Cardarelli et al. (2009), 
who analyse the factors determining the extent to which financial stress can affect 
economic activity, the financial stress plays a precursor role in the economic 
slowdown. A rapid expansion of credit, sharp rise in house prices and increasing 
borrowing by the corporate/household sectors contribute to a higher probability for 
the financial stress lead to severe economic downturns. Countries whose financial 
systems are dominated by more arm‟s-length based markets tend to be under 
financial turmoil effects and pronounced propagating shocks. Therefore, “prudential 
measures as well as monetary policy should pay due regard to the vulnerabilities that 
may build up and that eventually lead to greater output losses if the financial system 
is hit by a severe shock” (Cardarelli et al. 2009, p. 25). So, Rodrik asserts that 
“Lesson number one is that policy needs to guard not just against domestic shocks, 
but also shocks that emanate from financial instability elsewhere” (2009, pp. 1-2). 
This has several implications for the financial-openness policies for emerging 
economies like the Turkish economy. Financial liberalisation submits emerging 
economies to the high speculative sensitivity of external capital flows under the 
permanent threat of a sudden stop. Domestic banks as well as corporate sector 
borrowing needs are starved of external financing; the investment and the production 
are retrenched and aggravate the fall in domestic demand. 
The global-capital-flows-dependency8 dictates the monetary and exchange 
policies to the Turkish authorities who tried to hold domestic rates sufficiently high, 
until the last year, to capture more external flows they need to sustain the current 
account deficit. Real interest rates have evolved between 10-15% during mid-2006-
mid-2009 before decreasing at the end of 2009 under more accommodating 
monetary policies in the face of the global downturn. TCMB overnight interest rates 
(compounded rates) began a sharp decrease from January 2009 to reach a lower 
level around 7% in 2010.  Foreign direct investment flows followed an explosive path 
going up from 2.8 billion US$ in 2004 to 10 billion in 2005; 20.2 billion in 2006; 20.2 
billion in 2006; 22 billion in 2007 and 18.3 billion in 2008 before reaching a downturn 
                                                 
8
 For several insightful studies on this issue, see Hein, 2008.  
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with 8 billion in 2009. Parallel to this, stock market prices accompanied the rise of 
that of developed financial markets inducing a sort of asset inflation and fuelling 
speculative expectations. Istanbul Stock Exchange index (ISE 100) passed from 
25000 in the mid-2005 to more than 55000 at the beginning of 2008. After a decline 
up to 20000-25000 till the mid-2009, it has increased again up to 65000 during 2010. 
In the current crisis, there are some temporary opportunities that external 
capital can keep. After a sharp capital outflow in 2008, Turkey had become a sizable 
recipient of inflows once again at the end of 2009. In almost the same way, after a 
sharp depreciation at the beginning of 2009, the TL had already begun to appreciate 
by the mid-2009. While these resumptions in external confidence have prevented the 
economy from a monetary and financial collapse, the relatively high level of interest 
rates and an appreciated domestic currency posed the problem of the under-
competitiveness of the economy. As a result, a sharp decline in real GDP has 
reached its bottom in 2009. The quick recovery of the economic activity from the end 
of 2009 could show that the worst of the crisis is over. But the Turkish economy 
seems not to be able to prevent the world-wide consequences of the current financial 
turmoil as its vulnerabilities remain worrisome.  
Actually, the high growth era in the aftermath of the 2001 Turkish crisis was 
not due to a strengthening of internal (improvement of income distribution, 
expansionist stabilisation policies, etc.) and external (current account balance and 
capital inflows) resilience but to the cyclical opportunities due to the global 
speculative boom in the world during 2003-2007. As also stated by Ocampo (2009, p. 
716), the high performance in this period was a result of “the intensity of favourable 
external factors rather than of improvements in economic policy, which overall 
remained pro-cyclical in most countries”. Contrary to main Latin American economies 
that experienced real improvements in external balance sheets during the boom 
which provided relative protection against the current downswing, The Turkish 
economy remained in a fragile interval with an average of 5-6% of current account 
deficit/GDP ratio that seems to increase parallel to the growth rate during the booms 
and to maintain its path despite the reversal of the latter as in 2009-2010.  
Chart 9: Macroeconomic indicators* 1999-2009 (Source: TÜİK 2009, 2010 and TCMB) 
(%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
CPI 
(change/year) 
54.9 54.4 45 25.3 10.6 8.2 9.6 8.8 10.4 6.5 9 
(average 
on 
Jan-Sept) 
Average interest  
rate on 1 year  
deposits (end of  
the year) 
45.6 62.5 48.2 28.6 22.6 20.38 23.72 21.3 25.68 15.7  
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Discount rate  
of TCMB 
70 70 55 43 38 23 27 25 25 19→15 (at the 
end of the 
year) 
# 
GNP growth rate 
(1998prices)* 
6.3 -9.5 7.9 5.9 9.9 8.4 6.9 4.7 0.7 -4.7 11 
(Jan-Aug) 
Domestic  
debt stock/GNP* 
--------------------- 
New series 
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External debt 
service/GNP** 
11 16.9 12.5 9.1 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.2 Q4:9.3  
Share of  
short-term 
external  
debt/Total  
external debt 
23.9 14.4 12.6 15.9 20.1 22.4 20.5 17.3 18.2 18.75  
Current account  
(billion  US$)** 
-9.92 3.76 -0.6 -7.5 -14.4 -22.2 -32.9 -38.3 -41.9 -14.4 -27.98 
(Jan-
August) 
Trade account  
(billion US$) 
-
22.05 
-3.36 -6.4 -
13.49 
-
22.73 
-33.1 -
41.06 
-
46.79 
-
53.02 
-24.89 -32.04 
(Jan-Aug) 
Current  
account/GNP 
-4.9 2.3 -0.3 -2.5 -3.7 -4.6 -6.1 -5.9 -5.7 Q4/ 
-2.3*** 
-5.4 
(target) 
Total domestic  
bank 
loans/GDP**** 
17.2 15.3  10.32 11.88 14.91 20.53 24.59 27.14 31.15 34.89  
* From 2002, the ratios are calculated on the basis of GDP while there is no great difference between the GNP and the 
GDP in the Turkish economy. 
** New series from 2002. 
*** Current account balance targets (% of GDP) are: 2011: -5.4; 2012: -5.3; 2013: -5.2. 
****Regarding Chart 4, I used the last data offered by the TCMB to calculate again the ratio for the whole banking 
system’s domestic loans to the economy (interbank loans are excluded) at current prices. In the first two quarters of 
2010, total bank loans have increased of 23.6% with regard to the previous year value). 
# TCMB kept its one-week repo lending rate at 7% for the 11
th
 month and also reduced the overnight borrowing interest 
rate from 6.25% to 5.75% and held the lending rate at 8.75%. Late Liquidity Window Interest Rates (between 4:00 p.m. – 
5:00 p.m.): Lending rate was kept at 11.75% and the interest rate on borrowing facilities provided for primary dealers 
via repo transactions was kept constant at 7.75 percent (TCMB, Decision of the Monetary Policy Committee, October 
14, 2010).   
 
Then the second lesson, emphasized by Rodrik (2009, p. 2), is related to the 
growth strategy of emerging economies. In Turkey, despite the increasing 
macroeconomic confidence from 2003, the unemployment rate remained strongly 
high. It is worth to note that the unemployment rate has remained high despite strong 
growth rates since 2001 and has reached a contraction level of 16% in 2009 denoting 
low performance on the macroeconomic front. This seems to be related to the new 
accumulation regime of the Turkish economy since the beginning of its liberalisation 
process from the 1980s. The Turkish economy has followed, as stated in the 
previous sections, through its integration into the liberalised international circuits the 
same pattern that of the developed economies‟ finance-based growth regime9. The 
                                                 
9
 Stockhammer (2009) suggests the notion of “finance-dominated” accumulation regime as the 
financial developments shape the pattern and the pace of accumulation in economies integrated into 
the globalization process and which implement wage moderation policies and credit-driven 
consumption models through increasing current account deficits.   
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unemployment rate which was around 10% between 2005-mid-2008, increased from 
the mid-2008 up to 15% and from the end of 2009, it shrank to 13% (net of seasonal 
changes) while the employment rate kept its average low level around 42%. 
According to the latest data given by TÜİK in October 2010, the unemployment rate 
has reached, at the end of July 2010, 10.6% with 13.6% when the agriculture is 
excluded and 19.5% for the youth unemployment rate. In addition, while on a slightly 
decreasing path, the Gini coefficient remains high around 0.40 since 2006, according 
to a report of TÜIK of 2010 on distribution of annual incomes by quintiles ordered by 
household disposal income. That reveals that high growth rates of the boom period 
did failed to put the economy on a job-creating regime of accumulation. As stated by 
Uygur “In spite of the relatively high growth rates and substantial productivity 
increases in the 2000s until 2007, there was hardly any rise in real wages (...). In the 
first six months of the recent recession of 2008-09, real wages fell and it is highly 
likely that they will continue falling in 2009, as they did in the earlier crises” (2010, p. 
8). 
In addition, the external deficit continued to its rising path while the 
international competitiveness was not enough to reduce the trade account deficit 
(Chart 9). Unlike the changes in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis, exports fell just after 
the current crisis under the effect of the contraction in the global trade. Then the 
external demand did not operate as an adjustment mechanism in Turkey. This has 
also contributed to the widening of the trade account deficit. In the wake of the 
current crisis, the exports to Latin America and Middle-East countries increased 
whereas the exports to EU decreased. However, this counter-cyclical diversification 
of exports has not yet improved the trade balance because of the lower shares of 
these new markets in the Turkish external trade. Then, on the whole, the 
international trade downturn from developed regions contracted Turkey‟s exports by 
almost 27% in the last quarter of 2008; so, exports kept a decreasing path passing 
from an average of 35 billion US$ in the first quarters of 2008 to 25 billion per quarter 
from the end of 2008. However, in 2009, Turkish exports were down by 23% year-on-
year, imports also contracted even faster by 45% and the current account deficit went 
down by 67%. But this trend was reversed in 2010; imports rose by 34% more than 
the increase of exports (by 15%) leading again to the expansion of the current 
account deficit (TSPAKB, 2010). This shrank also the trade revenues of the economy 
relatively to its debt level: 
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Chart 10: Gross external debt/Exports (Fob) (Source: Undersecretary of Treasury, 2010) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Q1 2010Q2 
231.2 243 232.7 209.9 262.7 246.9 237.8 
 
The same path of increasing vulnerabilities can be observed in the evolution of 
the public sector‟s gross debt stock while this level remains below the level of most of 
the EU countries (EU27 around 62 to 73.6% over 2004-2009): 
Chart 11: Public sector gross debt stock (% of GDP) (Source: Undersecretary of Treasury, 2010) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
73.7 67.4 59.2 52.3 46.1 39.4 39.5 45.5 
Also, the public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP), decreasing since 
2002, crept up to high levels from 2008 while the public sector primary surplus 
decreased again sharply manifesting external dependency effects on the national 
economy: 
Chart 12: Public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP) (Source: Undersecretary of Treasury, 2010) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
12.1 10 7.3 3.6 -0.1 -1.9 0.1 1.6 6.4 
 
Chart 13: Public sector primary surplus (IMF definition, % of GDP) (Source: Undersecretary of Treasury, 2010) 
1993-2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
0.3 4.8 5.5 5.0 4.6 3.1 1.7 -1.1 
 
 Under such circumstances, the real sector has been impacted through two 
main channels; the contraction of the external demand since the end of 2008 and the 
fall of the domestic demand as the contribution of resident households‟ final 
consumption decreased sharply from 2008, accompanied by an impressive 
contraction of private investment (with strong decreases in the growth rate of the 
GFCF, passing from 3.1% in 2007 to -6.2 in 2008 and to -19.2 in 2009): 
 Chart 14: Contribution of expenditure types to growth rates of GDP (% at 1998 prices) (Source: TÜIK 2010) 
 Resident households  
final consumption  
Gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) 
2005 5.6 3.9 
2006 3.3 3.2 
2007 3.8 0.8 
2008 -0.2 -1.5 
2009 -1.6 -4.5 
 
Such a reversal has obviously accompanied the high volatility of the growth 
rate during the last three years: 
Chart 15: GDP annual growth rates (% at 1998 prices) (Source: TCMB 2010) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
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Q1 8.1 7.0 -14.5 11.7 
Q2 3.8 3.6 -7.7 10.3 
Q3 3.2 0.9 -2.9  
Q4 4.2 -7.0 6.0  
 
While the external debt stock has been worsened particularly for the private 
corporate sector: 
Chart 16: Private corporate sector’s external debt/GDP (%) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
17.5 22.9 24.7 24.9 27.8 
 
Contrary to the decrease of the formal external financial dependency of the 
banking sector, the external debt position of the private corporate sector has followed 
an increasing path since the aftermath of the 2001 crisis: 
Chart 17: Gross external debt stock (at the end of the year, million US$) (Source: TCMB) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Q1 
A. Total 129532 144097 160977 169901 207819 249553 277005 268194 266605 
A.1.Short-term 16424 23013 32205 38283 42616 43135 50448 49577 54472 
Public sector 915 1341 1840 2133 1750 2163 3248 3598 4697 
Private banks 5429 8351 12714 16562 19993 16167 21613 22127 26342 
Non-financial 
corporate 
8425 10461 13960 16178 17601 22061 23494 21785 21466 
A.2.Long-term 113108 121084 128772 131618 165203 206418 226557 218617 212133 
Public sector 63619 69503 73828 68278 69837 71361 75037 79819 80174 
Private banks 3029 3133 5798 12341 22078 30941 30049 27993 26746 
Non-financial 
corporate 
24350 24783 28245 34604 53736 79625 98224 91831 87937 
B. Share of the 
non-financial 
private corporate 
sector in total 
external debt* 
0.253 0.245 0.262 0.299 0.343 0.407 0.439 0.424 0.410 
* Author’s calculations from the data of TCMB  
 As one can easily observe (Charts 3, 4 and 17), the share of the short term 
external debt in the total has not really stabilised on a decreasing path in the 
subsequent period to the 2001 crisis: 
 Chart 18: Share of the short-term external debt in the total external debt stock 1990-2010 
% 1990 1993 1995 1999 2000 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2010Q1 
Short-term  
external debt/Total  
external  
debt 
19.37 27.51 21.43 22.2 23.9 14.4 15.97 22.53 17.28 18.48 20.43 
  
Such developments reveal that the Turkish economy remains under the threat 
of two main fragilities: the persistent external debt-dependent economic activity 
(especially for the corporate sector but also, indirectly, for the banking sector) and the 
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lack of competitiveness which submits the whole economy to the international trade 
uncertainties and increases its debt burden. These fragilities could hurt the seeming 
economic stability if the international context in the aftermath of the current global 
turmoil comes to remove the global markets‟ volatilities from developed to emerging 
economies. These fragilities would also keep strong the external constraints that 
dominate domestic economic policies since the 1990s and prevent possible 
development strategies from improving the income distribution inequalities and the 
domestic demand in a sustainable way.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
This quick overview of the path of the Turkish economy after three decades of 
liberalisation reveals that the country evolves in the current crisis with important 
concerns some part of which is related to unswept structural weaknesses of an 
internationally integrated emerging economy. Inherent structural failures and lack of 
long-term directed national and “voluntarist” proactive development strategies make 
that the economy remains unable to reach a sustainable and more resilient path of 
growth.  
Debates on the processes of transition in emerging economies towards a 
more open market economy and consequences of the liberalisation on the banking 
and financial systems in a vulnerable macroeconomic environment underline the 
complexity of the phenomenon of liberalisation. This complexity appears with more 
strength today to the observation of the difficulties that the developed financial 
systems undergo since 2007. The transformations implemented in the Turkish 
banking system since the 1980s and the ambiguous subsequent results appear as a 
study case suited to estimate the relevance of the modalities of banking reforms and 
financial liberalisation, but also to underline the central role that the growth 
mechanisms can play in the success and the stability expected from this process. 
It seems that the Turkish reforms have been carried out through an extremely 
fragile macroeconomic frame because of the weaknesses of the banking system and 
also the inadequacy of the stabilisation programmes. In particular from the end of 
1999, in spite of increasing deficits, these programmes were based on the exchange 
rate stability to reduce the inflation and to improve the credibility of the monetary 
policy on an international recognition of the stability of the national currency and 
provoked an infernal spiral. This modality of stabilisation fed the underlying 
macroeconomic and structural imbalances and increased the vulnerability of the 
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banking system the main transformation of which had been based on a hasty 
generalized liberalisation. Myopia to disaster and a highly speculative behaviour, 
which testify of a macular degeneration, arose from irregular banking behaviours 
under the pressure of markets recently liberalised. This evolution, accompanied with 
the structural macroeconomic fragilities, resulted in recurring banking crises (1982-
84, 1994, 2000-2001) and showed that the reforms depend on the consistency of the 
economic policies regarding the capacities and needs of the economy. 
The sequencing, studied by McKinnon (1991), indeed shows that the success 
of the financial reforms involves the respect for an order in the liberalisation process 
which should be based on a preliminary and consistent adaptation of the economy to 
the opening up of domestic markets in order to reduce the probability of structural 
distortions. Also, Bhattacharya (1997) emphasizes the decisive importance of the 
speed of the opening up of the capital account and of the integration of external 
financing flows to the evolution of the domestic economy. The author advocates then, 
in the objective of higher stability and credibility on markets, for a gradual 
liberalisation so as to mitigate the fragilities of the financial structure of the banking 
and no banking firms.  
The Turkish example shows that these conditions and mechanisms are not 
spontaneously reached by liberalised markets and by the risky dismantling of the 
public mechanisms of supervision. The financial sustainability (Debt/GNP) and the 
economic sustainability (competitiveness and growth) are weakened by the new 
regime of accumulation based on conservative monetary policies and on finance-
dominated markets. Such a regime, founding the modernization of the banking 
system on a fast and weakly structured liberalisation, aimed to satisfy the 
requirements of the short-term stabilisation programmes without considering 
capacities and needs of the economy. 
Developing and emerging economies suffer from a whole host of problems but 
as it is well stated by Rodrik “As the experience of successful countries 
demonstrates, what is required is strategic prioritization” (2009, p. 12). The only 
financial liberalisation, hastily and anarchically implemented –founded on the belief 
that free markets clear up spontaneously- could not provide a powerful growth. To 
date, with the current turmoil, market-oriented policies proponents recognize the 
relevance of Minsky‟s financial instability hypothesis. But a consistent conclusion 
cannot be founded only on the strengthening of market-friendly prudential regulation 
and supervision but before all requires some safeguards against global flows‟ 
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speculative volatilities. Because capital inflows exacerbate the investment constraint 
and then reduce economic growth through their effect on the direction of the 
monetary and exchange policies relied on external confidence, the financial 
openness can constitute a handicap rather than a suitable and sustainable source of 
real growth financing. Foreign borrowing boosted growth in Turkey as private returns 
in tradables were relatively high parallel to high current account deficit. But this 
growth has not focused on job creation. Large external deficit remained as a 
blockage factor against the widening of the positive impacts of the growth. More 
domestic saving mobilisation and the use of funds into job creating activities seem to 
be the necessary conditions for a sustainable recovery10. That requires a substantial 
effort in terms of new development policies based on the creation of quality and 
technology producing activities beyond the short-term private returns in tradables. 
It is advisable to develop policies within the framework of a macroeconomic 
action plan beyond the beliefs of the liberalism. One of the first actions to be 
undertaken in this objective consists in channelling the financial markets regarding 
the imperatives of the stable development. It seems that any overflowing of financial 
markets on the absorption capacities of the economy provokes hardly controllable 
negative consequences and reduces the sustainability of the growth path by creating 
imbalances which self-feed through uncontrolled global volatilities. 
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